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The importance of unconscious autonomic activity vs. knowledge in influencing behavior
on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) has been the subject of debate. The task’s developers,
Bechara and colleagues, have claimed that behavior on the IGT is influenced by
somatic activity and that this activity precedes the emergence of knowledge about
the task contingencies sufficient to guide behavior. Since then others have claimed
that this knowledge emerges much earlier on the task. However, it has yet to be
established whether somatic activity which differentiates between advantageous and
disadvantageous choices on the IGT is found before this point. This study describes
an experiment to determine whether knowledge sufficient to guide behavior precedes
differential autonomic activity or vice versa. This experiment used a computerized version
of the IGT, knowledge probes after every 10 trials and skin conductance recording to
measure somatic activity. Whereas in previous reports the majority of participants end
the task with full conceptual knowledge of the IGT contingencies we found little evidence
in support of this conclusion. However, full conceptual knowledge was not critical for
advantageous deck selection to occur and most participants had knowledge sufficient
to guide behavior after approximately 40 trials. We did not find anticipatory physiological
activity sufficient to differentiate between deck types in the period prior to acquiring
this knowledge. However, post-punishment physiological activity was found to be larger
for the disadvantageous decks in the pre-knowledge period, but only for participants
who displayed knowledge. Post-reward physiological activity distinguished between the
advantageous and disadvantageous decks across the whole experiment but, again, only
in participants who displayed knowledge and then only in later trials following their display
of knowledge.
Keywords: Iowa Gambling Task, somatic marker hypothesis, somatic marker, implicit learning, conscious
knowledge, reward learning
INTRODUCTION
The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT, Bechara et al., 1994) was devel-
oped to model complex and uncertain choice environments in a
laboratory setting. In it participants make a series of selections
from four decks of cards in order to make as much, or lose as lit-
tle, money as possible. Each deck pays money but all decks also
contain losses. The critical aspect of the IGT is that the decks are
set up so that those with the highest immediate payoffs have the
highest cumulative losses such that their repeated selection will
result in an overall loss. Participants must learn to avoid selecting
from these decks.
Bechara et al. (1996) suggested a role for emotional process-
ing in learning on the IGT. They reported that autonomic activity
which preceded deck selections (anticipatory Skin Conductance
Responses or aSCRs) differentiated between advantageous and
disadvantageous decks as healthy participants learned to select
advantageously on the IGT. In an influential paper Bechara et al.
(1997) suggested that this differential autonomic activity pre-
ceded participants’ ability to report any idea about a successful
strategy to pursue on the task. Participants were defined as having
a “hunch” if they could express the idea that decks A and B
were riskier (or C and D were safer) but not articulate explic-
itly why. If they could detail why A and B were riskier (or C and
D were safer) they had “conceptual” knowledge. Bechara et al.
(1997) found that, on average, healthy participants entered the
“hunch” period by the fourth questioning (after trial 50, although
the range was between trials 30 and 80) and the “conceptual”
period by the seventh questioning (following trial 80 with a range
of 60–90). Bechara et al. reported that anticipatory SCRs for
the disadvantageous decks were larger relative to the advanta-
geous decks and claimed that this difference emerged in normal
participants approximately between trials 10 and 50, before par-
ticipants could articulate any knowledge of differences between
deck types. However, although significant differences in choices
from deck types developed, the difference in aSCR between deck
types was never statistically significant. Patients with ventrome-
dial prefrontal cortex damage did not show this differential aSCR
activity and preferred the disadvantageous decks leading Bechara
et al. (1997) to conclude that the autonomic activity was neces-
sary to choose advantageously on the IGT and, further, as the
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difference in it preceded any consciously available knowledge, that
the autonomic activity acted as an unconscious bias that guided
behavior.
Subsequent studies have suggested autonomic activity and IGT
performance are related (Bechara et al., 1999, 2000, 2002; Carter
and Smith Pasqualini, 2004; Crone et al., 2004) while others
have failed to find a link (Tomb et al., 2002; Campbell et al.,
2004). But the interpretation of Bechara et al.’s (1997) results has
not been without challenge. The main criticism rests on when
participants have knowledge about the task contingencies suffi-
cient to guide behavior. Maia and McClelland (2004) replicated
Bechara et al.’s (1997) study and asked a separate group of par-
ticipants more specific questions than used by Bechara et al.
(1997). This group had consciously available knowledge suffi-
cient to guide their choices much earlier than reported by Bechara
et al. (1997). Crucially, this knowledge was present prior to the
point at which Bechara et al. reported that differential aSCR activ-
ity emerged. This suggested that participants’ behavior could be
based on explicit knowledge of the likely contingencies and, there-
fore, did not require an explanation dependent on unconscious
somatic activity. However, Maia and McClelland did not them-
selves record autonomic activity and so their data cannot rule
out the possibility that differential autonomic activity preceded
knowledge about the task contingencies.
The relative importance of knowledge about the IGT con-
tingencies vs. autonomic activity has been examined in numer-
ous studies. However, none have directly replicated Maia and
McClelland’s (2004) methods to examine the changes in par-
ticipants’ knowledge and autonomic activity as they complete
the IGT. Gutbrod et al. (2006) measured autonomic activity and
knowledge using Bechara et al.’s (1997) general questions every
twenty trials in amnesic patients and healthy controls. While
their controls learned to select advantageously and achieved
hunch knowledge about the IGT, their patients did not. This
advantageous selection occurred well before differential aSCRs
emerged. Gutbrod et al. (2006) argued that their results demon-
strated that knowledge about the task contingencies was the
key to success on the IGT as the amnesic patients did not
acquire knowledge, select advantageously or generate differen-
tial anticipatory autonomic activity but post-punishment SCRs
did differentiate between deck types. However, Gutbrod et al.’s
method introduced a delay between selection and feedback
that may have made the task extremely difficult for amnesic
patients. Without such long delays amnesic patients can learn
to select advantageously on the IGT (Turnbull and Evans,
2006). Unfortunately, Gutbrod et al. (2006) did not detail when
controls’ knowledge emerged. But, like Maia and McClelland
(2004), Evans et al. (2005) found healthy participants differ-
entiated between deck types at above chance levels after only
20 trials.
Persaud et al. (2007) explored knowledge of deck contingen-
cies on the IGT using post-decision wagering (PDW) as a novel
measure of awareness. Their results suggest that the difference
in the questions used by Bechara et al. (1997) and Maia and
McClelland (2004) results in earlier awareness of the contingen-
cies when Maia and McClelland’s specific questions are used.
Interestingly, in Persaud et al. (2007) the emergence of advan-
tageous PDW closely corresponds to when Bechara et al. sug-
gest their participants possessed conceptual, rather than hunch,
knowledge of the deck contingencies when general questions
are used, whereas with more specific questioning advantageous
PDW is closer to when Maia and McClelland found hunch level
knowledge. However, neither question style affected the time at
which behavioral preference for the advantageous decks emerged
nor did it appear to affect overall performance on the IGT.
These results raise the possibility that IGT selection behavior
does not simply follow acquisition of knowledge of deck contin-
gencies, as suggested by Maia and McClelland’s results, and so
opens the possibility that autonomic activity separately influences
behavior.
Guillaume et al. (2009) recorded skin conductance responses
and heart rate during the IGT and explored knowledge using
methods similar to Maia and McClelland’s specific questions.
However, knowledge was only examined at the end of the
task rather than concurrently. Thus, Guillaume et al. (2009)
were unable to determine when knowledge of the task contin-
gencies emerged and if it influenced autonomic activity. They
did report that participants with more accurate knowledge
of the contingencies selected more advantageously than those
with less accurate knowledge; that participants generated larger
anticipatory SCRs before selecting from the disadvantageous
vs. the advantageous decks; and IGT performance was posi-
tively correlated with the difference in this autonomic response
and with degree of knowledge but the latter measures were
uncorrelated.
Other researchers have examined the relationship between
autonomic activity and explicit contingency knowledge using
post-task questionnaires. Suzuki et al. (2003) found differen-
tial aSCR activity in the first 40 trials, replicating Bechara et al.
(1996, 1997), but no differences in ratings of deck riskiness
between groups split post-hoc on their post-selection SCR lev-
els, implying no relationship between knowledge and SCR levels.
Kleeberg et al. (2004) found aSCR and post-punishment SCRs
started at a higher level and increased faster in their healthy
comparison group compared to patients with MS. The healthy
controls learned faster but there was no correlation with auto-
nomic activity. Patients were generally correct when asked which
decks it was best to avoid but less neurologically impaired patients
made fewer disadvantageous selections and their aSCRs increased
across the task leading the authors to conclude that since knowl-
edge equated between patient groups, but somatic activity did
not, cognitive appraisal was not sufficient to account for advanta-
geous IGT behavior. But to reiterate, post-hoc questioning cannot
inform on when awareness develops. Instead, an examination
of contingency knowledge and autonomic activity is required
to determine whether the two are dissociable. To this end we
report an experiment using the method of assessing awareness
described by Maia and McClelland (2004) along with a measure
of autonomic activity derived from skin conductance record-
ing. Our aim is to determine whether knowledge sufficient to
guide behavior precedes differential autonomic activity or vice
versa.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
DESIGN
The experiment was a replication of Maia and McClelland’s
(2004) study with the addition that skin conductance responses
were measured. A mixed-design was used with Question Group
(General or Specific) a between-subjects factor, and Block of
trials a within-subjects factor. Three dependent measures were
obtained: participants’ deck selections on the IGT, participants’
knowledge of the task contingencies, and the change in par-
ticipants’ physiological arousal prior to card selection (aSCRs)
and following card selection (r or pSCRs; reward or punishment
SCRs).
PROCEDURE
On arrival for testing participants were given a brief description
of the task, an account of what was involved in the recording of
electrodermal activity, and in the General Question Group, infor-
mation about the recording of their answers using a tape recorder.
These participants were told that questions would appear on the
computer screen periodically throughout the task and they must
speak their answers into the tape recorder. It was emphasized to all
participants that the experimenter would not interact with them
nor answer any questions about the task after the opportunity
to ask questions about instructions had ended (following their
acknowledgement that they understood the task instructions).
Informed consent was obtained from all participants.
The index and middle fingers of participants’ left hands were
cleaned using an alcohol free wet-wipe. Once dry an isotonic
(0.5% saline) gel (Biopac Gel 101) was rubbed into the skin of the
medial phalanges of the index and middle fingers of participants’
left hand before the MP30 electrodes were attached. Participants
were instructed that it was important to stay as still as possible
throughout the experiment and to make themselves comfortable
so that they only moved their right hand when controlling the
mouse, and in the Specific Question Group, when they entered
answers using the keyboard.
Participants then read the task instructions. These were exactly
the same as those used in the Bechara et al. (1999, 2000; Fernie
and Tunney, 2006) with the addition of information about the
periodic interruptions in which questions would be asked. A
period of at least 5 minutes was allowed to elapse from electrode
attachment to task commencement to allow the electrode gel time
to be absorbed into each participant’s skin. During this time par-
ticipants were informed that the experimenter would be present
in the room but would not be monitoring their performance.
Participants were told that the purpose of the experimenter’s pres-
ence was to monitor the SCR record and, in the General Question
Group, to operate the tape recorder when required. They were
told that there would be no interaction with the experimenter
except if, in the Specific Question Group, clarification was needed
on the terms used in the questionnaire. Participants were then
reminded that the most important thing was to earn as much
money as possible, or to avoid losing as much as possible.
SCRs were recorded without interference until the task ended.
The experiment began once a visual inspection indicated that
the apparatus was reliably recording electrodermal activity. An
on-screen message instructing the participants to consider which
deck they would like to choose. No decks could be selected while
this message was on-screen. After 5 seconds another message
appeared telling participants to “Please select a card.” The mouse
pointer re-appeared and the decks became active. The 5 seconds
prior to deck choice constituted the period during which SCRs
were considered to be anticipatory. Following the selection of a
card the computer displayed the amount won accompanied by
the sound of a man shouting “Yippee!” This sound was marked
on an analog channel of the SCR record and allowed the accu-
rate pinpointing of SCR events in relation to deck choices. One
second after the reward, the amount lost was displayed accompa-
nied by the sound of a man shouting “Doh!” The reward and loss
information remained on-screen for 5 seconds. The instruction
to “Consider your next choice” was then displayed for 5 seconds
before participants were again instructed to choose a card. SCRs
in the 5 seconds following deck selection were considered to be
post-selection SCRs. Therefore, the inter-trial interval was at least
12 seconds but varied depending on how long participants took
to choose their next card following the instruction to do so.
The experiment concluded following 100 trials on the IGT and
when participants’ task knowledge had been probed nine times.
The length of time that the experiment took differed between
participants and was dependent on the speed with which they
selected cards and answered the questions. As there were more
questions in the specific question group these participants tended
to take longer. The experiment took around 1 h and although
participants were told the prospective length of the task this
information could provide no hint about when it would end.
On completion of the task all electrodes were removed and
participants were fully debriefed. Each participant received the
amount they had earned on the task plus an additional £2.
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty-two predominantly post-graduate students were recruited
from the University of Nottingham community via posters,
online advertisements, and direct email to members of a partic-
ipant pool. The volunteers were told that they would be partic-
ipating in a cognitive task and have the opportunity to earn up
to £12. They were told that some physiological measures would
be recorded and that the experiment took approximately 1 h.
Sixteen participants were randomly assigned to each question
group [the General questions of Bechara et al. (1997); or the
Specific questions of Maia andMcClelland (2004)]. Themean age
was 25.68 (σM = 1.22) in the Specific question group and 24.63
(σM = 0.92) in the General question group. There were nine male
participants in the Specific and seven in the General question
group.
APPARATUS—BEHAVIORAL TASK
A computerized version of the IGT with the hint instructions
and real money incentives was used (Fernie and Tunney, 2006).
Breaks in the behavioral task occurred after the first twenty trials
and from then on after each ten trial block so that participants’
knowledge could be probed using the condition-specific ques-
tions. More detail on these is provided below. The addition of
questionnaires and skin conductance recording resulted in the
task taking around 1 h to complete. As this experiment took on
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average four times longer than the previous purely behavior stud-
ies used in Fernie and Tunney (2006), the value of the payoffs
was increased to four times the amount. Therefore, wins increased
from 10p to 40p in decks A and B, and from 5p to 20p in decks C
and D. All values for losses increased similarly.
APPARATUS—KNOWLEDGE PROBES
The administration and structure of the questionnaires followed
the procedure of Maia and McClelland (2004). Briefly, the task
was interrupted after twenty trials and thereafter after every ten
trials when instructions on the computer screen informed partic-
ipants that they would be asked some questions about the task. In
the Specific Question group participants were given the detailed
questionnaire as used in Maia and McClelland (2004). The ques-
tionnaire was computer-based and required selection of options
using the mouse or entry of answers using the numerical keypad.
Three measures of knowledge were obtained for each deck at each
question period: a deck rating from −10 to 10 (Deck Rating),
an estimate of the average net amount won or lost on the deck
(Estimated Net) and a calculated net amount based on partici-
pants’ estimates of how much they would win, how often they
lost, and how much that average loss was (Calculated Net). The
participants were also asked which deck they would choose if they
only had one choice (One Deck).
In the General Question group participants were presented
with the two questions used by Bechara et al. (1997) on subse-
quent screens: “Tell me all that you know about what is going
on in this game” and “Tell me how you feel about this game.”
Participants’ responses were recorded using a tape recorder oper-
ated by the experimenter who sat behind a large dividing screen in
the same room as the participant. The questions were presented
on-screen to minimize any potential experimenter influence and
to equate the two question conditions. Interaction with the exper-
imenter was kept to a minimum and was initially restricted
to prompting participants to answer the question before them.
However, some participants’ answers were so minimal that some
additional prompting was occasionally required. In the main
this took the form of directing participants’ answers to their
knowledge of the decks.
The presentation and cessation of the questions in both condi-
tions was accompanied by a computer beep tomark the beginning
and end of the question period on the skin conductance record,
and to inform the experimenter when to start and end the tape
recorder in the General question condition.
APPARATUS—ANALYSIS OF GENERAL GROUP TRANSCRIPTS
Verbal responses to questions were transcribed from the tape
recording. Three post-graduate students, naïve to the experi-
mental hypothesis, were recruited and paid to assess the tran-
scripts and classify the knowledge displayed at each question
period using Maia and McClelland’s (2004) decision tree. The
assessors first undertook training on the decision tree using
sample answers created to cover all possible outcomes from
the tree. One hundred percent accuracy was required before
the actual transcripts were assigned. When the sample tran-
scripts were not correctly rated the assessor was told and asked
to try again. Most raters accurately rated each transcript on
their first attempt. Rarely were three attempts required, but
following correct answers the assessor had to convince the
experimenter (GF) of why they had reached the assessment
they had.
Once the actual transcripts had been assessed the assessors
met to compare results. Any disagreements on any of the partic-
ipant’s answers were debated until a unanimous decision among
the assessors was reached. If this was not possible a majority deci-
sion for that answer was used. These assessments of participants’
answers were used to determine when knowledge was displayed
in the General Question group.
CLASSIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE
Maia and McClelland’s (2004) attempt to replicate Bechara et al.’s
(1997) study was hampered by the lack of detail about how
Bechara et al. assessed knowledge and categorized it into two
(hunch and conceptual) of their four knowledge periods. Maia
and McClelland (2004) developed a detailed solution to resolve
this that resulted in a decision tree to categories each partici-
pants’ knowledge at each question period into one of the six
knowledge categories possible on the IGT. These are: no professed
knowledge, incorrect or incomplete hunch/knowledge, partial
hunch, hunch, partial conceptual, and conceptual. Even with this
decision tree there were still several ways knowledge could be
assessed in order to integrate it into Bechara et al’s knowledge
periods. This integration is effectively along two axes. The first
concerns whether knowledge expressed about only one of the
good decks is included as conceptual knowledge (partial concep-
tual). In a strict interpretation of Bechara et al’s criteria partial
conceptual knowledge would not count as conceptual knowledge
because it is not full understanding of both good decks—Maia
and McClelland (2004) called this grouping “both.” In the “par-
tial” grouping partial conceptual knowledge is included in the
conceptual period.
The second axis in integration of the two knowledge assess-
ment systems concerns when participants first show any level of
knowledge. A conservative approach would only count knowl-
edge expressed consistently throughout all question periods from
the one where it was first expressed through each subsequent
questioning i.e., if upon reaching one level of knowledge the par-
ticipant never returned to a lower state of knowledge. An aggres-
sive interpretation would allow an earlier expression of knowledge
to be counted even if later questioning revealed that this level
of knowledge was no longer being expressed at a later question
period. Maia andMcClelland’s aggressive, “partial” grouping best
fit Bechara et al.’s (1997) results. However, Maia and McClelland
focused on the “both” grouping as it more reflected Bechara et al.’s
(1997) classification of conceptual knowledge.
These terms are detailed here as they will provide different
answers for the question of when knowledge emerges with an
aggressive approach using the partial grouping likely providing
an earlier point than a conservative approach using the both
grouping. Each participant’s knowledge at each measurement was
independently assessed but mean results within groups will be
compared with the results of Bechara et al.’s (1997) and Maia
and McClelland (2004) criteria and the closest matching group
averages used.
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APPARATUS—ELECTRODERMAL ACTIVITY
A BIOPAC Systems MP30 system running on a Macintosh com-
puter was used to record electrodermal activity. Skin conductance
was recorded at 10Hz using two Ag/AgCl electrodes connected to
the volar surfaces of the medial phalanges on participants’ index
and middle fingers of the left hand (all participants were right
handed). Because the MP30 system does not have the facility
for a direct link between the recording computer and the task
presentation computer, marking the occurrence of events was
achieved by recording the sounds produced on the task presen-
tation computer during the task. These sounds were recorded
by the MP30 via an analog input. During the IGT gains and
losses were accompanied by concurrent auditory stimuli. These
served as markers for events in this experiment. Additionally,
the experimenter marked the skin conductance record when
an event occurred. As this measure is less reliable and not
as temporally accurate it was only referred to if any ambi-
guity about when an event occurred existed in the auditory
record.
SKIN CONDUCTANCE ACTIVITY ANALYSIS
Skin conductance responses were analyzed using the Student Lab
Pro software for the MP30 system. The first step in the analy-
sis was the removal of the downward drift in the SCR record. A
mathematical transformation provided by the Student Lab soft-
ware was used to remove it prior to analysis. This “difference”
transformationmeasures the difference in amplitude between two
data samples separated by a particular number of points (in this
case it was 10). The difference is then divided by the time interval
between the two samples.
The SCRs were analyzed using the area-under-the-curve mea-
surement. This measurement calculates the total area between a
waveform and a baseline value within the endpoints of a selected
area. In effect a line is drawn between the user defined start and
end points of the waveform. For anticipatory SCRs this was the 5
seconds prior to deck choice as determined by the auditory sig-
nal’s mark on the analog channel. For post-selection SCRs the
start point was 1 second after this marker and the end point was
again 5 seconds later. These area-under-the-curve measurements
were then divided by the time interval to give a value in amplitude
units per second (μS/s).
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL DATA
The principle behavioral measure of interest is Mean net score
which was calculated by subtracting the number of cards selected
in each ten trial block from the advantageous decks A and B
from the number selected from disadvantageous decks C and D.
Positive scores indicate a preference for advantageous decks and
an increase in the mean net score across blocks indicates that par-
ticipants learn to choose from the advantageous decks during the
course of the experiment.
Mean net score for the General Question group was 20.44
(SD = 22.06). A one sample t-test found that this was sig-
nificantly greater than zero, t(15) = 3.93, SD = 22.06, p < 0.01
indicating that participants in this condition showed an over-
all preference for the advantageous decks. The same was true of
participants in the Specific Question group. Their mean net score
was 28.56 (SD = 29.04) and this was significantly greater than
zero, t(15) = 3.71, SD = 29.04, p < 0.01.
Mean net score was calculated for each block of ten tri-
als and compared between Question Group and across Block.
Figure 1 displays this comparison. A mixed-design ANOVA
revealed no main effect of Question Group, F(1, 29) < 1. There
was a main effect of Block, F(4.31, 124.89) = 15.43, MSE = 44.26,
p < 0.01, that reflects the increase in mean net score with
more trials, but no interaction, F(4.31, 124.89) = 1.53, MSE =
29.0, p > 0.05 indicating that learning proceeded at a simi-
lar pace in both question groups. This replicates Maia and
McClelland’s (2004) result demonstrating that the nature of the
questions participants received did not differentially affect their
behavior.
KNOWLEDGE OF THE TASK: GENERAL QUESTION GROUP
The independent ratings suggested at least half the participants
reached what Bechara et al. described as the Conceptual Period
but this depended on themethod of classifying conceptual knowl-
edge (Table 1). Like Maia and McClelland (2004) the aggres-
sive approach provided the best fit to Bechara et al.’s (1997)
data and the discussion that follows will refer to this approach
only. However, unlike Maia and McClelland, the “partial” rather
than “both” grouping of conceptual knowledge best matched
Bechara et al’s data. In classifying knowledge aggressively all but
one participant displayed Hunch (or in Maia and McClelland’s
terms level-1) knowledge and this occurred on average after
43 trials (Bechara et al.—all participants by trial 50; Maia and
McClelland—88% of participants by trial 43).
Classification of conceptual knowledge using the “partial”
grouping fit Bechara et al.’s data better than using the “both”
grouping. In this case only around 30% of participants (vs. 62.5%
using the conservative approach) failed to exhibit conceptual
(or level-2) knowledge. Bechara et al.’s figure was also 30% and
there conceptual knowledge was achieved on average by trial 80.
Using either grouping method and an aggressive approach, con-
ceptual knowledge was achieved substantially earlier on average
in our study (by 53 or 55 trials for the “partial” and “both”
FIGURE 1 | Mean net score across 10-trial blocks. The closed circles
represent the Specific question group and the open circles represent the
General question group. Error bars are the standard error of the mean.
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Table 1 | Summary of participants’ knowledge expression in Bechara et al. (1997); Maia and McClelland’s (2004) replication condition and the
General question condition of this study.
Bechara et al. (1997) Maia and McClelland (2004) This study
Replication condition General questions
Conservative Aggressive Conservative Aggressive
% participants who did not reach the hunch period: 0 37.5 12 50 6.25
Average trial in which participants had hunch knowledge: 50 (30–60) 62 (5.8) 43 (4.6) 73 (6.8) 43 (3.9)
Partial grouping Partial grouping
% participants who did not reach the conceptual period: 30 47 25 62.5 31.25
Average trial in which participants had conceptual knowledge: 80 (60–90) 74 (1.6) 62 (6.6) 83 (9.2) 53 (6.2)
Both grouping Both grouping
% participants who did not reach conceptual knowledge: 77 60 87.5 50
Average trial in which participants had conceptual knowledge: 91 (5.6) 72 (4.8) 83 (9.2) 55 (8.0)
Figures in parentheses are the range of observations for Bechara et al. (1997) and the standard error of the mean otherwise. The aggressive/conservative axis
determines when knowledge exists. The conservative approach requires consistent knowledge expression from the first measurement through subsequent mea-
surements. The aggressive approach does not. The both grouping requires knowledge expression that both good decks are good. The partial grouping only requires
that one good deck is identified.
groupings, respectively). Maia and McClelland (2004) also found
that the “partial” grouping resulted in the majority of partici-
pants (∼75%) being classified as having conceptual knowledge
and on average this occurred by trial 62. However, they used
the “both” grouping when comparing their results to Bechara
et al.’s. With the current data, the “both” grouping would decrease
the proportion of participants with conceptual knowledge
to 50%.
KNOWLEDGE OF THE TASK: SPECIFIC QUESTION GROUP
Figure 2 shows the change in ratings for each deck across block.
The ratings are mostly negative for all decks. It is clear that most
participants do not believe any of decks are good. However, it is
equally clear that decks C and D are accurately perceived as being
better than decks A and B. Although this indicates that partici-
pants have not fully understood the patterns of gains and losses
of the decks, and thus of the task, such knowledge would be suffi-
cient to guide behavior advantageously. This knowledge is present
in most participants at the second question period. Participants
also correctly rated deck A as one of the disadvantageous decks
from the first opportunity they are given.
Figure 3 shows the number of times each deck was identified as
the one deck participants would choose if they could only choose
one for the remainder of the task. Aside from the first question
period, when deck B is often advantageous, most participants
would choose deck C or deck D. Indeed the number of partici-
pants who would choose deck C increases with experience of the
task, mirroring the behavioral data in previous results (Fernie and
Tunney, 2006).
Participants’ quantitative knowledge of the task as assessed
using the Expected Net and Calculated Net measures was not
good. The Estimated Net was an estimate of the average amount
won or lost on the deck while the Calculated Net was calculated
FIGURE 2 | Mean rating for each deck across question period. Error bars
are the standard error of the mean.
FIGURE 3 | The number of participants at each question period who
selected each deck as the One Deck they would choose if forced to
only pick from one.
Frontiers in Psychology | Decision Neuroscience October 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 687 | 6
Fernie and Tunney IGT knowledge vs. autonomic activity
from participants’ estimates of how much they would win, how
often they lost, and how much that average loss was when select-
ing from each deck. Figure 4 displays the Calculated Net measure
for each deck from every participant in the final question period.
The dashed line shows that the mean received value for each
deck is close to its pre-test expected value (decks A and B are
negative; decks C and D are positive). Pearson correlations were
calculated between the actual received values and each partic-
ipant’s Calculated Net measure from the final question period.
Calculated Net measures do not correlate with the values actually
received for deck B, C, or D (r = 0.46, 0.43, and 0.34, respec-
tively, p’s > 0.05), except on deck A (r = 0.92, p < 0.01). Actual
received values do not correlate with the Expected Net measure
on any deck (r = −0.20, 0.13, 0.19, 0.05 for decks A, B, C, and D,
respectively) as illustrated in Figure 5. Together these results sug-
gest that most participants’ quantitative knowledge of the deck
contingencies is not accurate. Indeed for many participants the
Expected or Calculated Nets are positive for decks A and B, and
negative for decks C and D. This may indicate that participants
are unable to retain quantitative knowledge about the decks or
that they did not comprehend what was required in the answer
for the measures themselves.
Table 2 displays a breakdown of when and what proportion of
participants displayed knowledge of the task contingencies when
actual received values are used. The One Deck and Deck Ratings
questions were used to assess hunch, or level-1 knowledge, while
FIGURE 4 | Calculated vs. actual expected value on each deck after 100
trials for each participant (except for participant 3 for whom figures are
following 80 trials). The calculated expected value was calculated from a
participant’s estimates of the average gain, average loss and frequency of
loss over ten selections from that deck. The dashed lines are the mean actual
expected values.
FIGURE 5 | Estimated vs. actual expected value on each deck after 100 trials for each participant (except for participant 3 for whom figures are
following 80 trials). The dashed lines are the mean actual expected values.
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Table 2 | Knowledge assessment for Specific question group using “partial” grouping (either deck with the highest net value at the time of
questioning received the best score on each measure) or “both” grouping (both decks with the highest net value at the time of questioning
received the best scores on each measure).
Question type “Partial” grouping “Both” grouping
Conservative Aggressive Conservative Aggressive
RATINGS
% participants who did not reach Hunch level: 20 0 50 12.5
average trial number in which they did so: 39 (6.8) 22 (1.0) 59 (7.6) 33 (3.04)
ONE DECK
% participants who did not reach Hunch level: 6.25 0 as “partial” grouping as there
is only one response possibleaverage trial number in which they did so: 47 (7.5) 21 (0.6)
EXPECTED NET
% participants who did not reach Conceptual level: 25 0 62.5 12.5
average trial number in which they did so: 51 (7.9) 26 (2.2) 57 (9.5) 36 (4.2)
CALCULATED NET
% participants who did not reach Conceptual level: 50 0 68.75 12.5
average trial number in which they did so: 65 (8.5) 26 (2.4) 72 (12.4) 36.4 (4.3)
Average trial values are rounded to the nearest trial. Values in parentheses are the standard error of the mean. When actual received values are used with a partial
grouping and aggressive approach all participants reach the hunch level by around trial 20 and conceptual level by trial 26.
the Expected and Calculated Net questions were used to assess
conceptual or level-2 knowledge. As conceptual knowledge of the
task was so poor (Figures 4, 5) and the focus of this paper is when
knowledge sufficient to guide behavior emerges only the break-
down of Deck Ratings and One Deck measures will be discussed
here.
An aggressive approach using a “partial” grouping was used in
the General Question group. This strategy suggests that all par-
ticipants have hunch level knowledge by trial 22 using the Deck
Ratings or by trial 21 using One Deck. More similar results to the
General group are obtained by using a conservative approach and
a “partial” grouping: 80% of participants have hunch level knowl-
edge by trial 39 using the Deck Ratings or by trial 47 (93.75% of
participants) using One Deck. In the analyses that follow where
differences pre- and post-knowledge are considered we will use
this latter strategy and the figures obtained from the Deck Ratings
measure because Deck Ratings required more information from
participants. Although, the strategies used to determine when
knowledge was present are different in each group, we believe
this is appropriate because participants showed no differences in
behavior and so it can be assumed that their experience of the task
was similar. We can further assume that their pre-task knowledge
was similar and as their behavior did not differ, their knowl-
edge remained similar throughout the task (though see Persaud
et al., 2007). All that differed between the groups then was the
specificity of knowledge probe. If this is the case then an aggres-
sive approach is appropriate for the General group because their
knowledge was not probed as effectively as the Specific group par-
ticipants. Ideally, a conservative partial approach would have been
used throughout but this would not have been sensitive enough
in the General condition to indicate when knowledge sufficient to
guide behavior appeared. The use of these two approaches results
in figures for knowledge emergence that is consistent between
groups and with the previous literature using the General ques-
tions. It is also consistent with the behavior shown in Figure 1.
Mean net score first moves above chance in both groups in block
4, the block during which the abovemeasures suggest participants
can determine C and D to be the best decks.
Further support is provided by an analysis of the proportion
of selections from each deck in the pre- and post-knowledge
periods across all participants who were categorized as having
displayed knowledge (displayed in Figure 6A). The proportion
of selections from decks A and B declines from the pre- to post-
knowledge period, whereas the proportion increases for decks C
and D. This supports the supposition that participants’ choices
are guided by knowledge of the decks. A 4 × 2 (Deck by Time)
repeated measures ANOVA examined these data. A significant
interaction between Deck and Time was revealed, F(2.28, 59.35) =
17.41, MSE = 0.03, p < 0.01; as was a main effect of Deck,
F(3, 78) = 7.48, MSE = 0.03, p < 0.01. There was no effect of
Time, F(1, 26) < 1. A complex interaction comparison examined
the interaction between Deck Type and Time by collapsing data
across advantageous and disadvantageous decks in each knowl-
edge period. This 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA found a
significant interaction between Deck Type and Time, F(1, 26) =
35.60, MSE = 0.03, p < 0.001; a main effect of Deck Type,
F(1, 26) = 15.38, MSE = 0.03, p < 0.001; but no main effect of
Time, F(1, 26) = 2.09, MSE < 0.01, p > 0.05. Subsequent simple
comparisons found that the proportion of advantageous choices
in the pre-knowledge period was not significantly greater than
the number of disadvantageous choices, F(1, 26) = 2.41, MSE =
0.03, p > 0.05; whereas it was in the post-knowledge period,
F(1, 26) = 31.84, MSE < 0.01, p < 0.001. Figure 6A shows that,
consistent with previous experiments, this difference appears to
be due to changes in selections from decks B and C. In the
post-knowledge period the proportion of selections from deck
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B has decreased below chance and the proportion of selections
from deck C has increased above chance. Similar patterns are
found in decks A and D, but the major changes lie in decks
B and C.
A similar pattern is shown in Figure 6B for the participants
who displayed no knowledge. The early period shown in the
Figure represents the proportion of choices from each deck up
until the mean trial at which participants in the knowledge group
displayed knowledge. The late period is the period from this mean
trial until the end of the task. While behavior in this group looks
similar to the knowledge group, there are several differences. The
proportion of selections from each deck is much closer to chance
in both time periods. In the late period, unlike the participants
with knowledge, selections from B are not below chance nor are
selections from deck C above chance. These observations were
tested in a 4 × 2 (Deck by Time) repeated measures ANOVA.
It found no interaction, F(1, 26) = 2.44, MSE = 0.01, p > 0.05;
no main effect of Deck, F(1, 26) = 1.29, MSE < 0.01, p > 0.05;
and no main effect of Time, F(1, 26) < 1. These results suggest
that only with knowledge sufficient to guide behavior do par-
ticipants select advantageously on the IGT replicating Maia and
McClelland (2004) but contradicting Bechara et al. (1997). The
next section will examine whether differences in physiological
responses exist prior to knowledge being displayed and so leave
an opportunity for an explanation of IGT behavior incorporating
somatic markers.
FIGURE 6 | Mean proportion of cards selected from each deck in (A)
the pre- and post-knowledge periods for participants who displayed
knowledge (n = 27), and (B) the comparable periods for participants
who did not display knowledge (n = 5). Error bars are the standard error
of the mean. The dashed line represents chance selection.
PHYSIOLOGICAL MEASURES—aSCR
Anticipatory SCRs were the mean area under the curve of the
SCR in the 5 seconds prior to selecting a card. Mean aSCRs for
each deck were obtained by taking the average aSCR for that deck
for each participant and dividing across participants. These mean
aSCRs are displayed by Group in Figure 7A. Figure 7A shows
that mean aSCRs are generally very low and that they are sim-
ilar in each Group. To determine if any differences existed, a
2 × 4 (Group by Deck) mixed-factor ANOVA was run. Although
mean aSCR was higher in the Specific Question Group than in
the General Question Group no main effect of Group was found,
F(1, 30) < 1. There was also no main effect of Deck, F(1, 30) < 1.
Despite the higher mean aSCR for deck B in the Specific Question
Group, there was no interaction between Question Group and
Deck, F(3, 90) = 2.02, MSE < 0.01, p = 0.12. As in the behav-
ioral analysis no differences in aSCR were found between groups
nor were any differences observed between decks. This first result
supports the conclusion that the different questioning did not dif-
ferentially affect participants, whereas the second contrasts with
the data reported by Bechara et al. (1997).
In the previous section it was determined that most partici-
pants in each group display at least hunch level knowledge of the
task between trials 40 and 50. In order to determine whether aSCR
differences existed between decks prior to this period, average
aSCRs before and after each participant’s expression of knowledge
were calculated for each deck for those participants who displayed
FIGURE 7 | Mean aSCRs for each deck in each group, (A) across all
selections; (B) in selections prior to and following knowledge
expression in those participants who displayed knowledge, and (C)
the equivalent figure to b for participants who did not demonstrate
knowledge—aSCRs before and after the mean trial at which
knowledge was expressed in those who expressed knowledge (trial 39
in the Specific Group and trial 43 in the General group). Error bars are
the standard error of the mean.
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knowledge (80% in the Specific group, 93.75% in the General
group). As there were no differences in aSCR between groups
in the previous analysis this factor was not included in the sub-
sequent analyses. Some participants did not select cards from
some of the decks in the period following their expression of
knowledge. As a result there were no SCRs on some decks for
seven participants who either chose only one deck in the period
after they displayed knowledge (deck C in one participant in the
Specific question group), or no longer chose from both deck A
or B (two participants in both groups) or did not select from
deck B (two participants in the Specific question group and
one in the General question group). In the analyses that fol-
low missing values were imputed using the automatic multiple
imputation method in SPSS 20.0 and the results pooled across
five imputations. The resulting 4 × 2 (Deck by Time) repeated
measures ANOVA found no significant effects: Deck by Time,
F(1.54, 40.08) = 2.0, MSE < 0.01, p > 0.05; Deck, F(1.74, 45.13) =
1.50, MSE < 0.01; Time, F(1, 26) < 1. The same outcome was
found when participants with missing data were excluded.
As automatic SCR recording was employed it is possible
that interference from SCRs following rewards or punishments
affected subsequent aSCRs. If so, then larger aSCRs would be
expected following a loss than following a gain. But an exami-
nation of aSCRs in each deck following a gain and a loss revealed
no such difference. These data were calculated for each partici-
pant and entered into a 4 × 2 (Deck by Reinforcer Type) repeated
measures ANOVA. No main effect of Reinforcer Type was found,
F(1, 27) < 1; nor was there a main effect of Deck, F(1.98, 53.33) < 1;
nor an interaction, F(1.74, 46.88)1 < 1. This suggests that auto-
matic gathering of SCRs did not impact on the clarity of the
physiological record.
The main purpose of this experiment was to determine if any
physiological responses distinguish between decks prior to par-
ticipants’ expression of knowledge; that is, SCR changes in the
pre-hunch period of Bechara et al. (1997). No significant differ-
ences in aSCR were found between decks before participants had
knowledge of the task contingencies. This does replicate Bechara
et al.’s result, and like their data the mean values found in the
present study within this period, displayed in Figure 7B, sug-
gested that a difference between decks A and B and decks C
and D may exist although there was no significant interaction.
Therefore, no evidence was found to support the hypothesis that
differences in aSCRs precede knowledge expression in partici-
pants who express hunch level knowledge. Figure 7C shows that
in participants who did not display any knowledge mean aSCRs
across the same time periods were at a similar level.
PHYSIOLOGICAL MEASURES—POST-SELECTION SCRs
Post-selection SCRs were the mean area under the curve of the
SCR in the 5 seconds after a card was selected. These SCRs were
split into those following a reward with no punishment (reward
SCRs or rSCRs) and those following trials on which punishment
occurred (punishment SCRs or pSCRs). Mean rSCR and pSCRs
for each deck were calculated for each individual. The mean of
these values provided the mean post-selection SCRs displayed
by Group in Figures 8A, 9A for reward and punishment SCRs,
respectively.
FIGURE 8 | Mean rSCRs for each deck in each group, (A) across all
selections; (B) in selections prior to and following knowledge
expression in those participants who displayed knowledge; and (C)
the equivalent figure to b for participants who did not demonstrate
knowledge—rSCRs before and after the mean trial at which
knowledge was expressed in those who expressed knowledge (trial 39
in the Specific Group and trial 43 in the General group). Error bars are
the standard error of the mean.
FIGURE 9 | Mean pSCRs for each deck in each group. (A) Across all
selections. (B) Mean pSCRs for the advantageous and disadvantageous
decks in selections pre- and post-knowledge expression in those
participants who displayed knowledge. (C) The equivalent graph to b for the
participants who did not demonstrate knowledge (n = 5)—pSCRs in the
period before and after the mean trial at which knowledge was expressed
in the majority of each group. Error bars are the standard error of the mean.
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Figure 8A shows that mean rSCRs are similar in each Group
but that there is a trend for rSCRs to be higher in decks A and
B. A 2 × 4 (Group by Deck) mixed-factor ANOVA was run to
examine rSCRs across all selections. There was no interaction,
F(1, 30) < 1; no main effect of Group, F(1, 30) < 1; but a main
effect of Deck was found, F(1, 30) = 5.97, MSE < 0.01, p < 0.01.
A planned complex main comparison was performed to investi-
gate whether rSCRs differentiated between the advantageous and
disadvantageous decks. It found that rSCRs were higher for the
disadvantageous decks, F(1, 30) = 10.12, MSE < 0.01, p < 0.01.
These results are consistent with previous research (e.g., Tomb
et al., 2002), in showing that choices that result in larger rewards
also result in larger SCRs.
To investigate whether rSCRs distinguished between selections
prior to or following the display of knowledge a 4 × 2 (Deck by
Time) repeated-measures design ANOVA was conducted. As no
group differences were discovered in the initial analysis Group
was removed as a factor in subsequent analyses. Missing values
were imputed as in the aSCR analysis. The same results were
found when participants with missing data were excluded.
An interaction between Deck and Time was found,
F(2.19, 56.97)1 = 3.99, MSE < 0.01, p < 0.05. As with the overall
analysis a main effect of Deck was found, F(2.13, 55.46) = 3.77,
MSE < 0.01, p < 0.05, but there was no effect of Time,
F(1, 26) < 1.0, p > 0.05. Figure 8B displays the mean rSCRs
pre- and post-knowledge in each deck. The interaction between
Deck and Time appears to be because rSCRs in the post-
knowledge period for the advantageous decks are lower than
the disadvantageous decks. In order to examine this further,
the data were collapsed across Deck to provide values for the
advantageous and disadvantageous decks in each time period
and an interaction contrast was performed. This is effectively
a 2 × 2 (Deck Type by Time) repeated-measures ANOVA, and
revealed a significant interaction between Deck Type and Time,
F(1, 26) = 9.01, MSE < 0.01, p < 0.01; a main effect of Deck
Type, F(1, 26) = 11.96, MSE < 0.01, p < 0.01; but no effect of
Time, F(1, 26) < 1. Subsequent simple comparisons found a
difference between Deck Types in the post-knowledge period,
F(1, 26) = 14.29, MSE < 0.01, p < 0.1, and not in the pre-
knowledge period, F(1, 26) < 1. In the selections after knowledge
is displayed participants’ physiological reactions following reward
distinguish between the good and bad decks.
Figure 8C presents rSCRs for the participants who did not dis-
play knowledge. Here the pre- and post-knowledge periods are
based on the mean values from the participants who did dis-
play knowledge. The early period includes the trials up to trial
39 and 43 for participants in the Specific and General groups,
respectively. The late period includes all the subsequent trials.
The mean values depicted in this Figure are much lower than
those for participants with knowledge, suggesting that knowl-
edge, and physiological activity may be linked. A similar pattern
of reduced physiological activity in the post-knowledge period
in decks C and D is also found in this group as in the partic-
ipants with knowledge, but here it is also found for deck B. A
4 × 2 (Deck by Time) repeated-measures ANOVA was also con-
ducted on this data. There was no interaction between Deck and
Time, F(3, 12) = 1.31, MSE < 0.01, p > 0.05; no main effect of
Deck, F(3, 12) = 1.54, MSE < 0.01, p > 0.05; and no main effect
of Time, F(1, 4) < 1. This result supports the conclusion from the
analysis of the with-knowledge group that knowledge influences
physiological activity. However, this conclusion is qualified by the
low number of participants included in this analysis.
Figure 9A shows pSCRs over all selections and all partici-
pants. Mean pSCRs are higher in the decks with low frequency
of punishment (B and D). Mean pSCRs are also higher than
mean rSCRs. A 4 × 2 (Deck by Group) mixed-factor ANOVA
revealed no interaction, F(3, 90) < 1 and no main effect of group,
F(1, 30) < 1, thus replicating the other SCR data that found no
group differences in SCRs. A main effect of Deck was found,
F(2.12, 63.66)1 = 4.40, MSE < 0.01, p < 0.05. Subsequent simple
comparisons revealed that pSCRs following selections from deck
A were significantly lower than those from deck B, F(1, 30) = 6.73,
MSE < 0.01, p < 0.05; as were selections from deck C, F(1, 30) =
10.02, MSE < 0.01, p < 0.05; while pSCRs for deck D were
also significantly higher than those from deck C, F(1, 30) = 5.73,
MSE < 0.01, p < 0.05. There was no difference in pSCRs follow-
ing selections from decks B and D, F(1, 30) = 2.96, MSE < 0.01,
p > 0.05, nor between decks A and D, F(1, 30) = 2.96, MSE <
0.01, p = 0.10, which replicates Crone et al. (2004) and supports
their conclusion that it is the magnitude of punishment and not
the frequency that is influential for pSCRs.
Due to the infrequent nature of punishment relative to reward
in all of the decks (far greater in decks B and D), many partici-
pants received no punishment in the post-knowledge period on
some decks either as a result of not choosing them or because
no punishment resulted from their choices. As this applied across
so many participants a 4 × 2 (Deck by Time) analysis became
impractical with the addition of missing values reaching unac-
ceptable levels. However, the question of interest was whether
physiological activity distinguished between the decks prior to
a display of knowledge. As such pSCRs were averaged within
participants in two ways. First, the mean pSCR for the advanta-
geous and disadvantageous decks in the pre- and post-knowledge
period were calculated for each participant. Figure 9B displays
these means for those participants who displayed knowledge. A
2 × 2 (Deck Type by Time) repeated measures ANOVA, equiva-
lent to that performed on the rSCR data, revealed a significant
interaction between Deck Type and Time, F(1, 26) = 4.44,MSE =
0.02, p < 0.05; but no main effect of Deck Type, F(1, 26) < 1;
nor a main effect of Time, F(1, 26) = 1.96,MSE = 0.02, p > 0.05.
Subsequent simple comparisons revealed that pSCRs were higher
for the disadvantageous decks prior to knowledge being dis-
played than in the period afterward, F(1, 26) = 6.04, MSE = 0.01,
p < 0.05.
Second, the mean pSCRs for the decks with frequent and
infrequent punishments were also calculated in each knowledge
period. A 2 × 2 (Punishment Frequency × Time) repeated mea-
sures ANOVA found no interaction, F(1, 26) < 1; nomain effect of
Punishment Frequency, F(1, 26) < 1; and no main effect of Time,
F(1, 26) = 1.96, MSE = 0.02, p < 0.05. This result contrasts with
Crone et al. (2004) who found higher pSCRs following choices
from decks B and D.
Similar analyses were carried out for the participants who
showed no knowledge. Figure 9C displays the mean values of
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pSCRs collapsed across the advantageous and disadvantageous
decks up to and after the mean trial at which participants with
knowledge displayed that knowledge. The 4 × 2 (Deck Type by
Time) ANOVA revealed no interaction, F(1, 26) = 1.42, MSE <
0.01, p > 0.05; no main effect of Deck Type, F(1, 26) < 1; and no
main effect of Time, F(1, 26) = 1.11, MSE < 0.01, p > 0.05. The
Punishment Frequency × Time ANOVA also revealed no inter-
action, F(1, 26) = 1.43, MSE < 0.01, p > 0.05; no main effect of
Deck Type, F(1, 26) < 1; and no main effect of Time, F(1, 26) < 1.
SUMMARY
Overall, we found that participants have knowledge about IGT
contingencies sufficient to guide advantageous deck selection
before the task’s halfway point. We found no evidence of antic-
ipatory autonomic activity that differentiated between deck types
prior to this knowledge emerging. Differences in post-selection
SCRs between deck types were found. Reward SCRs distinguished
between the advantageous and disadvantageous decks across the
whole experiment but only in participants who displayed knowl-
edge and then only in later trials following their display of
knowledge. Punishment SCRs were found to be larger for the dis-
advantageous decks in the pre-knowledge period but, again, only
for participants who displayed knowledge.
DISCUSSION
We report an experiment in which we examined the claim that
differential autonomic activity between deck types precedes the
emergence of knowledge sufficient to guide behavior on the
IGT. In contrast to previous research (Bechara et al., 1997) we
found no evidence of differential pre-selection autonomic activ-
ity. These results replicate previous findings that differential aSCR
activity is not necessary to succeed on the IGT (Gutbrod et al.,
2006). In the absence of differential aSCR activity healthy partici-
pants learned to select advantageously on the IGT and developed
knowledge of the task contingencies sufficient to guide behav-
ior after approximately 40 trials. Our results suggest that aSCRs
are not an unconscious measure of knowledge that predicts the
choices people make.
Although we found that aSCRs do not differentiate between
deck types prior to knowledge being displayed, a difference
between deck types found over all rSCRs was localized within
participants who displayed knowledge in the period following
that knowledge being displayed. This result provides qualified
support for the influence of knowledge rather than autonomic
activity in influencing behavior on the IGT. The absence of any
difference in aSCRs is problematic as a null effect can never be
evidence for any hypothesis, and the results from the pSCRs sug-
gest physiological responses occur for larger primary punishers
but only in the initial period of the task. One possibility is that
pSCRs did not distinguish between decks in the post-knowledge
period because participants were aware that those decks had
the worst losses. Alternatively the pre-knowledge pSCRs might
influence subsequent decisions and constitute the first stage in a
process toward somaticmarkers. This position is supported by the
absence of these effects in participants who displayed no knowl-
edge. So the physiological results are ambiguous showing that
differences in post-selection SCRs emerge following knowledge
for rewards but prior to knowledge for punishments. It could
be argued that the post-knowledge difference in rSCRs indicates
relief at escaping from a choice on a disadvantageous deck with-
out a punishment. This would reflect the influence of knowledge.
After all, these decks are more risky than the advantageous decks.
Differential SCR activity, including aSCRs, may just reflect this
awareness of risk.
Both Campbell et al. (2004) and Kleeberg et al. (2004) have
reported failures to replicate the aSCR difference between deck
types reported by Bechara et al. (1997). We also found that aSCRs
did not increase over time replicating earlier results using a com-
puterized version of the task (Suzuki et al., 2003; Carter and Smith
Pasqualini, 2004). A possible explanation for the absence of dif-
ferences in the aSCRs is the automated way in which they were
gathered. The experimenter controlled the length of the inter-
trial interval between SCR acquisitions in Bechara et al. (1997).
This was to ensure that participants’ physiological activity had
returned to baseline following the previous choice. We did not
employ exactly the same methods as Bechara et al. (1997) and
so it is possible that as the inter-trial interval was fixed to a
greater extent in the current experiment, physiological activity
following the previous choice interfered with anticipatory phys-
iological activity on the next choice. However, Crone et al. (2004)
employed a similarly automatic methodology ensuring that the
inter-trial interval was as long as reported by Bechara et al. (1997)
and found similar results to theirs. The inter-trial interval in the
experiment reported here was as long as the average reported
by Bechara et al. (12 seconds). However, we found no differ-
ences in aSCRs following rewards or punishments. The results
reported here show that the emergence of knowledge occurred
at a similar point in the IGT as claimed by Bechara et al. (1997),
but found no evidence for their claim that this was preceded by
differential somatic activity. This has implications for Damasio’s
somatic marker hypothesis (SMH, Damasio, 1994, 1996). The
SMH integrates emotional processing with rational decision-
making positing a critical input from an embodied emotional
system (somatic markers) in making decisions in complex and
uncertain situations. As such, the IGT has been used extensively
as a test of SMH. If accepted at face value our results are prob-
lematic for the SMH. Participants in this experiment improved
on the IGT and displayed knowledge of which decks were worst
in the long-run, yet the results suggest aSCRs played no part
in this process. It may be that participants in this experiment
did not have the same physiological reaction as those in other
experiments but if this is the case it suggests that like other, clin-
ical studies (North and O’Carroll, 2001; Heims et al., 2004) the
absence of autonomic activity does not preclude learning on the
IGT. Additionally, several studies (Hinson et al., 2003; Turnbull
et al., 2003; Jameson et al., 2004) have shown that impairments in
executive components of working memory detrimentally impact
on IGT performance, suggesting that differences in aSCRs are
driven by cognitive processes (implying knowledge) rather than
vice versa. Alternatively, differential autonomic activity may have
occurred in our sample, yet remained undetected because we used
the relatively crude SCR measure. That we did not employ other
measures of autonomic activity such as heart rate or respiratory
response is a limitation of our study.
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The results of this experiment are not only problematic for
Bechara et al.’s (1997) account of IGT behavior. Knowledge suf-
ficient to guide long-term advantageous selection emerged in the
majority of participants at around the same time as Bechara et al.
(1997) claimed. Participants were able to identify one of the best
decks when initially questioned. As Maia and McClelland (2004)
pointed out, unless losses have been experienced this will ini-
tially be deck A or B. But when losses begin to be encountered
on these decks, they become disadvantageous, and it is then that
participants have a problem keeping up. This was reflected in the
assessment of participants’ knowledge using either an aggressive
or a conservative approach. For knowledge to be revealed using a
conservative approach requires that knowledge to be present con-
sistently across questioning and as losses are experienced on decks
A and B, participants struggle to identify C and D as the new
best decks. This time overlaps with when Bechara et al. (1997)
claimed the aSCR difference emerged (trials 10–50). Kleeberg
et al. (2004) reported that although they found no difference in
aSCRs between deck types the increase in aSCR they observed
averaged across all decks emerged between trials 20 and 40. These
aSCR differences may be related to the shift in polarity of deck
received values. The results from our study mean that Maia and
McClelland’s (2004) assertion that participants have knowledge
sufficient to guide their behavior from the first questioning is
supported, but unlike Maia and McClelland, our examination of
participants’ knowledge when their first losses on what become
the disadvantageous decks are experienced, does not support the
claim that this knowledge reflects the received deck contingen-
cies. This also provides some support for the claim that failure to
learn a successful strategy on the IGT may be linked to deficits in
reversal learning (Rolls, 1999, 2005; Dunn et al., 2006).
As Maia and McClelland (2004) found, the assessments of
participants’ knowledge here sometimes indicated that their
behavior did not reflect the knowledge that they possessed.
Participants often did not select one of the best available choices
despite the knowledge probes indicating that they were able
to make this distinction. One explanation for this behavior is
that their knowledge is not complete and few possess accurate
knowledge of the deck contingencies. This makes non-optimal
deck selection a reasonable option as participants attempt to
explore the decks to learn more about their contingencies (Maia
and McClelland, 2005). However, as Figures 4, 5 show, few
participants come close to achieving this understanding. Indeed,
most participants gave all the decks a negative rating suggest-
ing that they were unaware that either decks C or D were
profitable with repeated selection. This also suggests that for par-
ticipants in this experiment the times when they lost money
were most influential when they made their ratings. Certainly
the pattern of changing selection from decks B and C driv-
ing learning observed in previous studies (Fernie and Tunney,
2006; Lin et al., 2007) was replicated here and was reflected
in the question responses of participants given the Specific
questions.
Persaud et al.’s (2007) claim that question style influenced
awareness of deck contingencies is interesting in the context of
our finding that participants’ continued to select sub-optimally
despite the presence of knowledge sufficient to guide behav-
ior. There was no difference in when participants began to
select advantageously between Persaud et al.’s groups demon-
strating, surprisingly, that awareness, as measured with PDW,
did not affect behavior. Regardless of whether PDW is an accu-
rate measurement of awareness (Overgaard et al., 2010; Mealor
and Dienes, 2012), Persaud et al.’s results seem to show that
participants may have increased understanding of the task contin-
gencies, or at least decreased uncertainty, following more specific
questioning. However, Persaud et al. do not report on what degree
of knowledge their participants possessed despite asking them the
same questions we did. It may be that this increased knowledge,
or decreased uncertainty, acted to reduce risk, or loss, aversion
(Schurger and Sher, 2008) when wagering, but was not sufficient
to reduce the exploratory behavior necessary to learn more about
the task contingencies.
Our results suggest that participants do not generate antic-
ipatory physiological activity sufficient to differentiate between
deck types in the period prior to acquiring knowledge sufficient
to guide their behavior. Knowledge required to profit on the
IGT emerged later than claimed by Maia and McClelland (2004)
but was not a complete understanding of the nature of the IGT.
Indeed our results differed from those reported by both Maia and
McClelland (2004) and Bechara et al. (1997). Both groups sug-
gested that the majority of their participants end the experiment
with conceptual knowledge of the IGT. We found little evidence
in support of this conclusion, but conceptual knowledge was not
critical for advantageous deck selection to occur.
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